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I. INTRODUCTION
There seems little dispute that historically, investigation and prosecution of
sexual assault have left a great deal to be desired. Police have been notoriously
nonresponsive to reports of sexual assault, if not outright hostile.' Prosecutors have
been reluctant to prosecute all but the most blatant and violent of sexual assaults2 and
judges have instructed juries in a manner further burdening those cases which have
hurdled the investigative/prosecutive barrier. 3 When prosecution has been brought,
cross-examination of the complaining witness traditionally has permitted inquiry in-
to past consensual sexual activities, resulting in publication of the most private aspect
of a person's life under the guise of "relevance to consent." '4 But perhaps the most
serious problem of all is one antecedent to all of these: the reluctance of victims of
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. The research for this article was partially supported by the
University of Wisconsin Graduate School. Its assistance is much appreciated.
A debt of gratitude is also owed to Ms. Barbara Beermann, a third year law student at the University of Wisconsin,
whose background in assisting victims of sexual assaults and whose commitment to thoroughness and precision contrib-
uted much to this article.
1. S. Bizowmts'i.R, AGAINST OUR WIL 309-12 (1975); S. EsrmcH, REAL RAPE 15-18 (1987).
2. Convictions are most likely to occur in cases that fit society's stereotype of rape-an act committed by an
armed stranger-and are less likely in cases in which the woman and her assailant knew each other [which
account for 70-80% of all sexual assaults], especially if they were dating or had any prior sexual contact. Due
to that bias, police and prosecutors are often reluctant to charge perpetrators in acquaintance-rape crimes, just
as juries are often unwilling to convict. This bias is so strong on all levels of the legal system that some rape
crisis counselors now advise victims of acquaintance rape not to become involved in criminal proceedings at all.
R. WARsHAW, I NEVER. CALLED rr RAPE 12, 127 (1988).
3. E.g., former CALIFORNIA JURY INSTucno, -CR1SINAL INTs'ucno No. 10.06 (3d rev. ed. 1970), prohibited in
1974 by Act of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1093, 1974 Cal. Stat. 2320 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127d(a)
(West 1985)):
Evidence was received for the purpose of showing that the female person named in the information was a woman
of unchaste character.
A woman of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible rape but it may be inferred that a woman
who has previously consented to sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent again.
Such evidence may be considered by you only for such bearing as it may have on the question of whether
or not she gave her consent to the alleged sexual act and in judging her credibility.
See also M. HALE, TE HISTORY oF THE PLEAS OF r"HE CROWN 606 (1847) (rape is a charge "easily to be made and hard
to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho' never so innocent.")
4. The traditional justification for inquiry into a complaining witness' past sexual conduct was twofold: First,
"unchaste" women were thought of as more likely to consent to sexual relations People v. Hastings, 72 111. App. 3d 316,
390 N.E.2d 1273 (1979), and second, "unchastity" was viewed as importing dishonesty. See Virgin Islands v. John, 447
F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1971); S. BROWNIILI.LER, supra note 1, at 370-71.
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sexual assault to complain, 5 so that the criminal justice system, with all its imper-
fections, is not even triggered into action.
There seems equally little dispute that some progress has been made in the past
several years. Whether it is because of the increasing number of women recruited for
police work or the development of sensitive crimes units,6 or both, or because of a
cause antecedent to both, the investigative component of law enforcement has be-
come more responsive to victims of sexual assault. 7 The creation of private victim
support organizations certainly has facilitated such increased responsiveness. 8 Cases
have been prosecuted which undoubtedly would not have reached the courtroom in
former days, 9 and some of the more outrageous judicial comments that graced earlier
decisions seem to have significantly diminished in number. 10
The problem of unlimited cross-examination of a complaining witness's sexual
past has been dealt with by the federal government"1 and all states but Arizona and
Utah 12 through the passage of rape shield laws. These laws are designed, through a
variety of means, to restrict the historically unlimited inquiry into a woman's sexual
past in order to negate the claim of nonconsensual sex. By curtailing such inquiry, it
is hoped that not only will a particular case be resolved on more rational grounds, but
5. Out of a sample of 3187 undergraduate women on 32 college campuses, 15.3% reported having been raped.
Out of those 494 women, 42% told no one, 5% reported the attack to police and 5 reported to rape crisis centers. R.
WARSHAW, supra note 2, at 48-50.
6. For example, the Madison, Wisconsin, police force as of March 1989 had 56 female police officers as opposed
to 24 in 1979. Telephone conversation with police expediter Maryann Thurber, March 22, 1989. District Attorney's
offices in King County in Seattle, Washington; Milwaukee County, Wisconsin; New York County, New York; Dade
County in Miami, Florida; and Cook County in Chicago, Illinois, have sensitive crimes units that specialize in the
prosecution of sexual assault and child abuse cases.
7. See, e.g., R. WARSHAW, supra note 2, at 1: "Although official response [to the crime and the victims of rape]
was still slow in coming, police and prosecutorial procedures in many states changed to offer more support for victims
• . .and some states developed more effective ways to investigate and prosecute rape complaints."
8. There are over 274 rape crisis centers in the United States; there is at least one in every state. NATIONAL
COALITION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT JANUARY 1988 DIRECTORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL MBIBERS (published by Lois
Loontjens, King County Rape Relief).
9. See State v. Gulrud, 140 Wis. 2d 721, 412 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1987). The defendant was convicted of three
counts of second degree sexual assault. The victim was his former girlfriend, who drove him home after the rape occurred,
returned to her apartment, and reported the sexual assault to the rape crisis center later that day. The victim had had
consensual sexual intercourse with defendant on prior occasions.
10. There are, from time to time, judicial statements reflecting outmoded concepts. In Wisconsin three such recent
instances are a matter of public record. See, e.g., Capitol Times, Madison, Wisconsin, May 27, 1977, at l (Judge Archie
Simonson, at a sentencing hearing for a teenage rapist, stated he felt rape was a normal reaction to a sexually permissive
society. The judge was removed from office in a recall election.); Capitol Times, Madison, Jan. 13. 1987 (Judge William
Reinecke, at a sentencing hearing for the rapist of a 5-year-old girl stated, "I am satisfied we have an unusually sexually
promiscuous young lady and that this man just did not know enough to knock off her advances."); In re Judicial
Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Ralph G. Gorenstein, 147 Wis. 2d 861, 870, 434 N.W.2d 603, 607
(1989) (Judge Ralph Gorenstein, during cross-examination of the victim at a trial for second degree sexual assault, ordered
the victim to stop crying, stating "I think the female response to [sic] crying to any tough situation is inappropriate in a
courtroom," and comparing her to a victim who testified the previous week stated, "she sat there and answered the
questions in a businesslike, straightforward answer-like way, and I think you can do the same thing." Judge Gorenstein
was suspended from sitting as a Reserve Judge for two years.) There is no reason to assume the Wisconsin experience
is atypical. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 86 CR-006, (Ky. Ct. App. May 11, 1988) (dissent); Ms.-Trial!, Ms. MAGAZINE,
September 1988, at 64, describing the refusal of a federal district court judge to refer to a female attorney as "Ms." He
asked her if he could call her "sweetie."
I1. FED. R. EvYD. 412.
12. C. McCORMUCK, McCORinucK ON EvIDENCE § 193, at 573 (3d ed. 1984).
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that a victim's reluctance to complain, grounded on fear of a "second rape" 1 3 at trial,
will be eliminated as a factor in decisionmaking.14
The purpose of this Article is to examine the different types of rape shield laws
which have been passed, to note their differences, to explore the kinds of problems
which have arisen under them, and to propose a solution by which some of those
problems can be avoided in the future. As will be seen, rape shield laws vary in
approach and in scope. In the decade or two since their passage, cases which have
arisen under them have demonstrated that the legislative effort at balancing a com-
plaining victim's right to privacy and a defendant's right to present legitimate defense
evidence has not been as finely tuned as either interest requires. The end result has
been reversals of judgments of conviction which serve only to lengthen the prosec-
utive process by requiring retrials several years after the underlying event. Aside from
the inevitable weakening of the prosecution's case incident to a belated retrial,' 5 the
psychological burden for the complaining witness is also prolonged, a consequence
directly at odds with one of the major purposes of a rape shield law in the first place.
II. RAPE SHIELD STATUTES 16
A. Different Types of Statutes
Professor Harriet Galvin, in an exhaustive and illuminating study of the nation's
rape shield laws,' 7 has divided such laws into four categories: the Michigan,
Arkansas, 18 California, and federal approaches. In examining these categories, the
parameters affecting the passage of such legislation should always be considered. On
13. The fact that the woman is "on trial" as much as the defendant becomes apparent when one looks at the
issues which most frequently come up during the hearings: .. did the woman consent; did the woman struggle;
the woman's sexual reputation, habits and behavior; the woman's general character . ... The court process
recapitulates, in a psychological manner, the original rape situation. . . .The focus of the woman's concerns
... soon shifts from the defendant to the defense lawyer. He becomes the assailant in this new arena .... Again
and again they [the victims] described the [defense] lawyer's actions as making them a nervous wreck, being
offensive, twisting their words, degrading them, making them cry, and embarrassing them. These statements
are similar to the ones the women made about the rapists immediately following the rape.
Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape: The Victim and the Criminal Justice System, in 3 VICTIMOLOGY: A NEW Focus 21, 28-29
(I. Drapkin & E. Viano eds. 1975).
14. "[T~he exclusion [of prior sexual conduct evidence] promotes effective law enforcement because victims can
report crimes of rape and deviate sexual assault without fear of having the intimate details of their past sexual activity
brought before the public." People v. Ellison, 123 Ill. App. 3d 615, 626, 463 N.E.2d 175, 183-84 (1984).
15. The acquittal rate on retrial after reversal has been reported at 50%. Roper & Melone, Does Procedural Due
Process Make a Difference?, 65 JUDICATUS 136, 139 (1981) (a rate significantly higher than for first trials).
16. The term "rape shield law" has been universally applied to laws restricting the examination of a complaining
witness about her sexual past. As such they create a "privacy shield" for such witnesses. They certainly do not provide
a protection from rape and therefore seem to have been misnamed. Similar laws have been described more precisely. For
example, laws creating a journalist's privilege have been called "'Journalist Shield Laws," G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 448-49 (2d ed. 1987), a more precise description. The term "rape shield," however, has been
so universally used to connote the concept of privacy protection for victims of sexual crimes that no effort to change such
usage, however inaptly coined, will be undertaken here.
17. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 763 (1985-86).
18. Galvin's article refers to the Texas-type statute, rather than the Arkansas-type statute. Since her article,
however, the Texas statute has been changed but Arkansas, which had a Texas-type statute at the time of Galvin's article,
has retained its law.
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the one hand, there is the desire to provide a certain rationality to the decisionmaking
process by eliminating evidence having no bearing on consent and likely to confuse
the jury, evidence which also serves the highly undesirable purposes of invading a
witness's privacy and discouraging victims from bringing their complaints to the
criminal justice system. 19 On the other hand, there is the defendant's right to a fair
trial which includes the right to present evidence bearing directly either on the
defendant's guilt or innocence, or on the credibility of a major prosecution witness.
The Supreme Court cases of Chambers v. Mississippi20 and Davis v. Alaska l are the
judicial expression of that other hand-grounded, of course, in the Constitution's
guarantee of a fair trial and due process of law.
Almost half the states have modeled their rape shield laws on the Michigan
prototype. 22 These statutes create a general prohibition of any evidence of prior
sexual conduct by the complaining witness subject to designated exceptions which
usually number at least two. Prior sexual relations with the defendant are usually
excepted, 2 3 as are sexual relations with third parties to explain physical evidence of
sexual activity such as pregnancy, semen, or venereal disease. 24 When the defendant
proposes to elicit evidence under one of the exceptions, there are usually procedural
requirements compelling advance notice of such intent and in camera hearings to
resolve questions raised under these procedures.25
It is very clear that in states following the Michigan prototype, the legislatures
have left courts with little room to maneuver. The balance between interests limiting
inquiry into a victim's sexual past2 6 and the defendant's interest in presenting evi-
dence helpful to the defense is struck legislatively and definitively. The opposite
approach is taken by Arkansas and nine other states which follow it.27 In these
19. See supra note 14.
20. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
21. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
22. Galvin, supra note 17, at 908-11.
23. With the accused, only on consent: ME. R. EviD. 412; MINN. R. EvID. 404(c); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015
(Vernon Supp. 1986); VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (1988).
24. Physical consequences evidence: N.C. R. EviD. 412 (all physical consequences); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 3255
(Supp. 1989) (semen, disease, pregnancy); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1989) (semen, pregnancy,
disease, injury). Tennessee and Wisconsin include prior false allegations of sexual assault as exceptions to their rape shield
laws. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 972.11(2), 971.31(11) (Vest 1985).
25. Under Illinois' rape shield law the defendant must make an offer of proof at an in camera hearing to determine
whether evidence of his prior relationship with the victim will be admitted. The offer of proof must be specific as to the
date, time and place the prior sexual conduct is alleged to have occurred. These procedures are necessary only if the victim
denies the prior sexual conduct with the accused. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 115-7(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989). Under the
Michigan rape shield statute the defendant must file a written motion and offer of proof with the court within 10 days of
the arraignment. The court then has discretion to order n in camera hearing. MicH. Comtp. L~ws ANN. § 750.520j(2)
(Vest Supp. 1989). The Alabama rape shield law provides that the court shall conduct an in camera hearing to determine
the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence, the proceedings shall be included in the trial transcript, and the court
shall state by order what evidence, if any, may be introduced at trial and in what manner. ALA. CODE § 12-21-203(d)
(1986).
26. The word "victim" is used interchangeably with the term "complaining witness" throughout this article. From
a precise criminal justice point of view, the latter is the preferred manner in which to describe the woman claiming sexual
assault since the term complaining witness does not imply a conclusion about the incident underlying the trial. The term
"victim" assumes that no consent was given since only then are there both a crime and a victim.
27. Galvin, supra note 17, at 907. At the time of Galvin's article, Texas was within this category ofjurisdictions.
It has since changed its rape shield law. TEx. R. CRIM. EvtD. 412.
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jurisdictions, the law creates no substantive evidentiary exclusions28 but rather in-
sures an in camera determination of the question in a setting where the court is
specifically instructed to consider whether the probative value of evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effects. 29 While it may appear initially that such a purely procedural
approach would not make a significant change in trials, Professor Galvin's study of
appeals from trial court decisions restricting defendants' ability to explore the sexual
past of the victim suggests that courts, which prior to the enactment of the statutes had
been articulating the very reverse proposition, now generally exclude such evidence
on the ground that it is not relevant to the credibility of the victim.
It could be argued that a review of appeals from convictions is an inadequate
basis for any conclusions about the effectiveness of the Arkansas-type statutes be-
cause of the one-sided nature of the appellate process. The government cannot appeal
from an acquittal, and when the trial court's discretion was exercised in favor of
admissibility and when the defendant was acquitted, there will be no appellate de-
cision to review. Even when the defendant is convicted, if the evidentiary ruling on
prior sexual conduct by the victim was in favor of admissibility, the issue cannot be
raised on appeal and the lower court's decision will not be discernible from the
appellate decision unless that ruling is collaterally germane to the issues raised.
Whatever the merit to these observations, it is unlikely that the same judges who
rule in favor of exclusion in the cases when appeals are taken would rule dramatically
otherwise in different cases, especially since the rulings are made before the verdict
is known. Further, Galvin's review of cases under the Arkansas statute, where both
the prosecution and the defendant may take an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial
ruling under the rape shield law, suggests no such pattern by Arkansas trial judges.
In ten of eleven such interlocutory appeals, it was the defense who raised the issue,
suggesting that at least as far as Arkansas prosecutors were concerned, trial courts
were ruling correctly.
The federal rape shield law-Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence-partly
combines the Michigan- and Arkansas-type statutes. Under Rule 412, followed in six
states, 30 there is a general rule excluding a victim's past sexual conduct subject to a
number of exceptions which vary with each jurisdiction. 3 1 Generally, prior sexual
relations with the defendant are admitted on the defense of consent and sexual
relations with others are admitted to prove that physical evidence of sexual assault is
not attributable to the defendant. The Rule then provides for a constitutional catchall
28. The Alaska and New Jersey rape shield statutes require courts to consider the privacy interest of the victim as
an explicit counterweight to relevance of prior sexual conduct evidence. In addition, both statutes presume that evidence
of prior sexual conduct occurring more than a year before the date of the charged offense is inadmissible. See Galvin,
supra note 17, at 878-79.
29. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 411810.2(b) (1977).
30. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86F (West 1985); HAW. R. Evto. 412; IowA R. EVID. 412; N.Y. CRINt. PROC. LAW
§ 60.42 (MeKinney 1981); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.210 (1988). Texas' recently enacted rape shield law brings it within
this category as well. Tex. R. CraMi. EvmD. 412.
31. For example, Oregon specifically allows prior sexual conduct evidence to show motive to fabricate or bias and
to rebut medical evidence introduced by the state, and Connecticut, among other purposes, specifically allows evidence
of prior sexual conduct between the complainant and the accused, and evidence of physical consequences. OR. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 40.210 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86F (West 1985).
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clause: essentially, when the court determines that the evidence in question must be
admitted to insure the defendant's right to a fair trial, then the evidence is admitted.
As is the case with most rape shield legislation, there are procedures requiring a
motion under the catchall clause to be made in advance of trial for an in camera
determination of the issue.
The California approach divides evidence of the complaining witness's conduct
into two categories: evidence relating to consent which is inadmissible, and evidence
relating to credibility which is admissible.32 While the recognition that evidence of
past sexual conduct may be admissible for one purpose but not another is helpful, 33
it invites the danger of resurrecting the concept that "promiscuity imports dishon-
esty," a concept rejected by California courts prior to the enactment of its rape shield
law. 34 In fact, the inclusion of past sexual conduct for purposes of credibility was
spawned by the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska.35 The language of the
statute itself therefore is needlessly broad. Further, there is the danger that in cases
where the issues of consent and credibility merge, the statute may result in the
admission of the kind of evidence rape shield laws are designed to avoid-prior
sexual acts offered to prove consent in the instant case. 36 Ironically, the Washington
and Nevada rape shield statutes, based on California's law, accept the consent/
credibility dichotomy but admit the past sexual conduct evidence for purposes of
proving consent but not lack of credibility. 37
B. Rape Shield Laws: Rules of Relevance or Privilege?
Despite the prevalence of rape shield laws there is surprisingly little discussion
of whether these laws are rules that define what is relevant, rules which acknowledge
that certain types of evidence are relevant but exclude such relevant evidence because
the probative value is outweighed by counterweights, or rules which acknowledge
that relevant evidence should be excluded because of the privacy interests of the
victim in particular, and the need to encourage victims to report crimes and partic-
ipate in the administration of justice process in general.
Indeed, the general justification for rape shield laws at various times includes all
four. Some courts have found the justification to be (1) the harassment and humili-
ation of the victim, 38 (2) the exclusion of irrelevant evidence, 39 (3) the need to keep
the jury focused on relevant issues, 40 and (4) the furtherance of effective law en-
forcement by insuring that victims are not discouraged from cooperating with the
32. CAL. EvID. CODE. §§ 782, 1103 (West Supp. 1989).
33. Galvin, supra note 17, at 794.
34. See People v. Johnson, 106 Cal. 289, 294, 39 P. 622-23 (1895).
35. 415 U.S. 308 (1974); see Comment, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26
HASTINGs L.J. 1551, 1562-63 (1975).
36. People v. Varona, 143 Cal. App. 3d 566, 192 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1983).
37. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (1986).
38. People v. Comes, 80 II1. App. 3d 166, 175, 399 N.E.2d 1346, 1353 (1980).
39. People v. Ellison, 123 Ill. App. 3d 615, 626, 463 N.E.2d 175, 183-84 (1984).
40. State v. Morley, 46 Wash. App. 156, 730 P.2d 687 (1986).
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police for fear of the trial. 4 ' Some courts rely on all four. 42 As will be seen, this
hodgepodge of justifications combines three different evidentiary concepts.
1. Relevance
When proof of prior sexual conduct is excluded because it has no bearing on
consent, the rape shield statute is clearly a statute of relevance. Irrelevant evidence,
however, is already excluded under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
the inevitable counterpart to that provision either in the common law or in the
evidence code of all the states. 43 What we have then is a special kind of relevance
determination, legislatively made, that certain evidence is not relevant to a particular
case. This is both unusual and impossible.
The only other effort in the Rules of Evidence to legislatively define what is
relevant is found in Rule 404(b), which provides that evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Indeed, at first blush,
Rule 404(b) bears a striking similarity to a rape shield law, only as its reverse. If the
prosecution attempts to prove that a particular person is the rapist alleged, it is not
permitted, under Rule 404(b), to use prior sexual assaults solely for the purpose of
proving the one in issue. From this perspective, a rape shield law precluding proof of
prior sexual conduct by the victim to prove consent seems the perfect mirror to such
a provision. There are, however, some major differences, one of which is that Rule
404(b) provides that the evidence excluded by the general sweep of the rule may be
admissible for other purposes. Rape shield laws following the Michigan prototype
have but a small number of narrowly defined exceptions and no leeway for anything
else.
As will be seen in Part III, the failure of the Michigan-type shield law to contain
such leeway has resulted in repeated findings of unconstitutionality, or where the
courts are reluctant to find a statute unconstitutional, to findings that the law is
inapplicable or does not mean what it says. These conclusions follow inevitably from
the effort of trying to legislate relevance without allowing for the infinite variety of
circumstances that can coalesce to form the facts of a particular case. The federal
statute provides a case in point.
Rule 412 sets forth the general exclusionary rule with respect to the complaining
witness's past sexual conduct, establishes procedural requirements if the general rule
is not to be followed, and then excepts from the general rule, if admitted in accor-
dance with the procedural requirements, "past sexual behavior with the accused...
offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the
41. State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St. 2d 14, 391 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1979).
42. State v. Herndon, 145 Wis. 2d 91, 108, 426 N.W.2d 347, 363 (Ct. App. 1988); Ellison, 123 II1. App. 3d at
626, 463 N.E.2d at 183-84 (1984).
43. See, e.g., TEXAs R. Cmti. EVID. 402: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
Constitution, by statute, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible."
sexual behavior with respect to which rape or assault is alleged.' "44 On its face this
seems like a rational and precise statement of when prior sexual contact with the
accused is relevant and one would be hard pressed to find fault with it. That inability,
however, is solely a function of the limits of one's imagination. United States v.
Willis, 45 fortuitously one of the few federal rape prosecutions, illustrates such limits.
Willis was a black employee of the S.S. United States, and on one of its
transoceanic voyages-hence federal jurisdiction-was alleged to have raped a white
passenger from Italy. Willis's defense was that prior to the alleged rape he had had
consensual sexual relations with the woman but because she feared she would have
a mulatto child, she accused him of raping her on a day, as it turned out, when,
according to him, they had no sexual contact at all. Thus, Willis's defense was not
consent; Willis claimed nothing happened. In order to present his defense, however,
he had to put into evidence his prior sexual contact with the complaining witness.
That part of Rule 412 which provides that past sexual behavior with the accused is
admissible upon the issue of consent with respect to the alleged rape would have been
of no avail to Willis. There can, however, be no doubt that Willis was entitled to
prove his past sexual relationship with the complaining witness. The constitutional
catchall provision of Rule 412 would permit such proof; without such a provision, the
statute as applied would be unconstitutional, 46 a result directly attributable to the
difficulty of an all-inclusive relevancy determination by the legislature or drafters of
the rule.
2. Relevance versus Counterweights
As we have seen, one justification for rape shield laws is that whatever relevance
the prior sexual conduct of the complaining witness has, it is outweighed by the
damage to her privacy interests and, as well, the confusion such evidence of prior
conduct brings to the jury's deliberations. By definition, when evidence of such
conduct is introduced into the trial, it deals with other events and other participants
which usually are more remote than the subject of the litigation. There is, therefore,
as a general rule, the possibility that the probative value of the evidence, concededly
meeting minimal relevance requirements, will be outweighed by the counterweights
of confusion of the issues and waste of time. Some rape shield laws are grounded on
the legislative balancing of these different interests.
Because the test for relevance is so minimal47 -is the proponent's case stronger
or the opponent's case weaker than would be so without the evidence?-there is
already in pre-existing law a mechanism designed to exclude relevant evidence whose
probative value is small. Rule 403 provides that a court may exclude relevant evi-
44. FED. R. EviD. 412.
45. 33 F.R.D. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
46. This would be the case, for example, under the Pennsylvania law. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (Purdon
1983).
47. FED. R. EviD. 401.
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dence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice,
confusion, waste of time, or misleading the jury.48
There is, of course, one major difference between Rule 403 and a rape shield law
which balances the different interests. Rape shield law balancing is done legislatively;
that is, for all cases. Rule 403 creates the mechanism of balance but leaves it to the
trial judge to decide, in each individual case, how the scales tip when probative value
is put on one side and the counterweights of prejudice, confusion, and waste of time
are put on the other. A relatively common problem in sexual assault cases demon-
strates the difficulty of legislative balancing.
When a young girl testifies about sexual contact with an adult, the very use of
sexual terms and familiarity with sexual concepts creates a corroborative element
with respect to her direct examination. In such a case, the prosecution has not
"opened the door" to proof of other sexual activity by the complaining witness other
than by presenting the bare minimum of its case. The defendant in these cases often
wishes to avoid the corroborative component of such evidence by showing that the
victim had prior sexual experiences, and that those experiences account for her
familiarity with terms and concepts one ordinarily would not expect from a person her
age.
4 9
If the complaining witness is eleven years old, then the corroborative force
(probative force) of her knowledge, i.e., "expertise," will obviously be stronger than
if she is fifteen. Correspondingly, the probative force of proof of prior sexual conduct
will be greater if she is eleven rather than fifteen. It is therefore immediately apparent
that the age of the complaining witness is a variable of the admissibility issue on an
almost theoretically infinite scale of variability. Other considerations affecting the
balance exist on a scale of comparable variation. What was the prior sexual conduct?
Was its scope of the magnitude that would explain all, some, or just a small amount
of the "expertise" which triggers its possible admission? How recent was it? How
difficult is it to prove such conduct? How long will it take? Is it in dispute, or
conceded, or partly conceded?
It should be plainly apparent from this brief dissection of but one of the many
problems occurring with respect to prior sexual conduct that any effort to legislatively
balance probative value and counterweights is doomed. The settings in which these
problems arise simply cannot be pigeonholed with enough precision to permit the
undertaking. Not surprisingly, such an effort at conclusive legislative balancing is
unprecedented. The closest the rules of evidence come to such an effort is once again
Rule 404 and even there, the balance is not frozen. Examination of a Rule 404
situation demonstrates the difference.
It could be argued that proof of prior crimes is relevant, under the minimal
definition of relevance, to a charge of subsequent and similar criminality. To use the
sexual assault analogy, when a man convicted of six prior sexual assaults is on trial
for a seventh and claims that the sexual relations were consensual, it would seem
48. FED. R. EvIo. 403.
49. See State v. LeClair, 121 N.H. 743, 433 A.2d 1326 (1981).
1253
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
relevant, within the Rule 402 definition of the term, that on six past occasions the
defendant had forcibly overcome resistance against sexual contact. Presumably, if it
happened six times in the prior year in settings similar to the one in issue, it would
be "very" relevant,50 or to use the Rule 403 terminology, highly probative. Never-
theless, under Rule 404, if the prosecution offered such evidence to prove forcible
sexual conduct in the case in issue, it would not be permitted to do so.
If one accepts the relevance of such evidence, as I believe one must, then the
question becomes, why is it excluded? There appears to be a balancing in Rule 404
which, essentially, gives the litigant against whom the similar acts are offered the
benefit of a clean slate. The rule therefore represents a legislative judgment that
whatever the probative value of the evidence, it is more important that the person
against whom it would otherwise be admitted have the benefit of starting from
scratch.5 1 Since codified in the rule, this is a legislative policy judgment no different
in form than a rape shield law striking a balance in favor of exclusion. The difference,
however, between a rape shield law and Rule 404 is that Rule 404 contains the "if
offered for other purposes" provision so that the legislative requirement of exclusion
is tempered by an awareness that evidence may be admissible for purposes other than
a prohibited one. A majority of rape shield laws permits no such tolerance.
3. Rape Shield Laws as Laws of Privilege
Rape shield laws are the product of two common law homilies fundamentally
antagonistic to modern concepts of sexuality. The first is the notion that prior con-
sensual sexual conduct itself makes more likely consent on a given, later occasion.
This idea has been both prosaically articulated as "the underlying thought here is that
it is more probable that an unchaste woman would assent.., than a virtuous one" 52
and more colorfully in People v. Abbot,53 where the New York courts, 150 years ago,
distinguished between a woman "who has already submitted herself to the lewd
embraces of another, and the coy and modest female severely chaste and instinctively
shuddering at the thought of impurity .... And will you not more readily infer assent
in the practiced Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous
Lucretia?" 54 The second kernel of wisdom, one which had fallen into considerable
disfavor in recent years because of its one-sided thrust, was that promiscuity imports
dishonesty,55 a concept, incredibly, which courts refused to apply to men: That which
50. Evidence is either relevant or not. There is a certain conceptual impurity in referring to "highly" relevant
evidence or "minimally" relevant evidence. The term "probative" is a more appropriate quantifier.
51. Sometimes the justification advanced for excluding evidence of similar conduct is that there is a serious risk
that a jury would be prejudiced by such evidence and basically find against the actor on the gut theory that if he did it
six times he did it seven. C. MCCOMICK, supra note 12 §§ 185, 190, at 545. This cannot, however, be the basis for the
rule since the rule applies both to jury and nonjury trials, and in nonjury trials, the court is deemed incapable of prejudice.
Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1981). The only justification for the rule is the clean
slate concept.
52. Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 CoLuti. L. REv. 1, 15 (1977).
53. 19 wend. 192 (N.Y. 1838).
54. id. at 195-96.
55. Brown v. State, 50 Ala. App. 471, 474, 280 So.2d 177, 179, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 774, 280 So.2d 182
(1973).
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"destroys the standing" for truth of females "in all walks of life has no effect
whatsoever on the standing for truth" of males.
56
It is understandable why the common law notions that prior consensual sexual
conduct make consent more likely and detract from a complaining witness's credi-
bility are anathema to today's world and why a legislative body attempting, by
statute, to permanently rid the courtroom of such arguments would frame its words
in terms of relevance. Certainly the plain fact of prior consent does not make consent
in a given case more likely and certainly it has no bearing on credibility. Therefore,
if rape shield laws simply provided that "when evidence of prior sexual conduct is
offered for purposes of showing consent in a particular case or to impeach the
credibility of the complaining witness through a general attack on the character of the
witness, it is not admissible" there would not be a problem.5 7 As has been seen,
however, rape shield laws go beyond such limited objectives and attempt to exclude
prior sexual conduct altogether, unless offered for one of the specified purposes. By
their own terms, they appear to articulate more than simple relevancy concepts.
Despite the greater breadth to such laws, they are still generally regarded as rules
of relevance. For example, Federal Evidence Rule 412 is found in Article IV of the
Rules, that part dealing with "Relevancy and its Limits." Professor Galvin, in her
thoughtful study of over a decade of cases under rape shield laws, concludes that the
principal goal of a rape shield law should be the exclusion of irrelevant evidence, and
since a defendant has no constitutional right under either Davis v. Alaska or Cham-
bers v. Mississippi to the admission of irrelevant evidence, there is no fundamental
conflict between the protection of a victim's privacy interests and the defendant's
right to a fair trial.
Some courts, however, view the rules of evidence under rape shield laws as rules
of privilege.5 8 There are both procedural and substantive consequences to such a
view. First, if rape shield statutes create a privilege rather than simply articulate a
legislative reminder to courts as to what is relevant and what is not, then the woman
whose privacy right underlies the privilege is far more likely to have standing in
pretrial disputes dealing with the meaning and scope of a rape shield law. Such
standing is far more difficult to come by if a ruling admitting prior sexual conduct is
simply viewed as a ruling on relevance. Indeed, it would seem difficult to justify
those cases which give the victim standing to participate in the trial court's decision
56. State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 532, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (1895); Galvin, supra note 17, at 787; Berger, supra
note 52, at 16.
57. Since irrelevant evidence is already excluded under the rules of evidence in every jurisdiction, the need for such
a statute is itself an interesting commentary on problems in sexual assault trials. Prior to the enactment of a rape shield
law, when a court admitted such evidence, the issue could obviously not be raised on appeal since the evidentiary ruling
was in favor of the one party who could appeal a judgment of conviction. When the evidence was excluded, however,
the defendant could raise the issue on appeal. It is clear that enough appellate courts were overturning convictions because
such evidence had been excluded to require legislative action. See, e.g., United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 272 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979) (overruling) Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953));
People v. Fryman, 4 III. 2d 224, 122 N.E.2d 573 (1954); Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 Mass. 605, 328 N.E.2d 496
(1975); People v. Ruiz, 71 A.D.2d 569, 418 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1979).
58. See, e.g., State v. walsh, 126 N.H. 610,495 A.2d 1256 (1985); State v. Gonyaw, 146 Vt. 559, 507 A.2d 944
(1985).
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on admissibility 59 or to appeal an adverse ruling6° if anything less than a privilege
were involved. In upholding the woman's right to appeal a pretrial decision permit-
ting the introduction of evidence under the federal rape shield statute, the Fourth
Circuit noted that there was no other way her privacy interests could be protected
since "no other party in the evidentiary proceeding shares these interests .... ,,6,
Second, there is the question of waiver. In State v. Gavigan,62 the defendant was
charged with sexual assault committed in the victim's apartment after she had invited
him in to her apartment from a public hallway where he was waiting for someone else
to return. The prosecution contended that the ensuing sexual encounter was forcible,
while the defendant contended it was consensual. To assist in proving its case, the
prosecution tendered evidence that the victim, who was then twenty-eight years old,
was a virgin prior to the encounter with the defendant. The obvious thrust of this
proof was the reverse of the prohibited common law inference: if she had not con-
sented to sexual relations by the age of twenty-eight, she was not likely to do so with
a stranger.63 The trial court admitted the evidence and the conviction was aff'rmed.64
If the rule excluding the victim's prior sexual conduct (or lack thereof) is seen
as a rule of relevance, then obviously the victim cannot waive an impediment to
admissibility since questions of relevance are for the court to decide. If, however, the
rule is seen as one of privilege, then obviously the beneficiary of the privilege is free
to waive it, and if the evidence satisfies other admissibility requirements, including
relevance, there will be no reason to exclude it. When seen from this perspective, a
privilege to exclude evidence of prior sexual conduct embraces both otherwise ad-
missible and inadmissible evidence, something usually the case with any privilege. 65
If the holder of the privilege waives it, something the holder of any evidentiary
privilege can do, 6 6 and if the evidence meets the remaining obstacles to admissibility,
it should be admitted.
Any other result is both patronizing and needlessly categorical. It may well be
that a majority, indeed an overwhelming majority, of sexual assault victims treasure
59. See Walsh, 126 N.H. 610, 495 A.2d 1256.
60. Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981).
61. Id. at 46.
62. 111 Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).
63. The sole evidentiary issue was whether the prosecution could permissibly argue that the complainant's virginity
made consent less probable, not that virginity established the fact of such lessened probability.
64. For subsequent history to the Gavigan case, see infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. In State v. Williams,
16 Ohio App. 3d 484, 477 N.E.2d 221 (1984), aff'd, 21 Ohio St. 3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986), the Ohio courts found
that the victim waived the protection of Ohio's rape shield law when she denied having consensual sexual relations with
the defendant by testifying she was a lesbian. Despite the restrictive provisions of Ohio's rape shield law, evidence of past
heterosexual conduct on her part was admitted to rebut the claim of lesbianism. The court found that by introducing
evidence of lesbianism, the complainant waived the protection of the rape shield law.
65. For example, an attorney may be aware of information learned from a client which contains assertions by the
client based on other than first hand knowledge. If the attorney-client privilege were waived, that would not insure the
admissibility of such evidence at the trial of someone else, even though other portions of what the client told the attorney
might be.
66. A person can consent to the warrantless search of his house, waiving fourth amendment protections, testify in
a grand jury after having been advised of the right not to have to do so, waiving fifth amendment protections, or proceed
to trial without counsel, waiving sixth amendment protections.
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and find essential the right to their privacy afforded by a rape shield statute. It defies
common sense, however, to conclude that all such victims always will insist on that
right with respect to all prior sexual conduct which, in certain cases, may be minimal,
already public knowledge, or something whose publication simply does not partic-
ularly offend them. In any event, such judgments should be left to the person whose
rights are protected by the rape shield laws, as is the case with every other privilege
created by law. To single out this particular group of persons-complaining witnesses
in sexual assault cases-and state conclusively that they cannot waive a right to privacy
a statute gives them is to treat them in a manner consistent with the common law found
so abhorrent, and understandably so, by proponents of rape shield legislation.
There are, however, consequences to a "privilege" approach to rape shield
statutes beyond such procedural ones. Privileges, as a general rule, state that the
interests of arriving at the truth will be subordinated to some other societal interest. 67
Some of these other interests, such as the avoidance of compelled self-incrimination,
the sanctity of one's home, or the confidentiality of one's conversations with an
attorney, are constitutional in origin. Others, such as the confidentiality of inter-
spousal communications or the sources for a journalist's writings are subconstitu-
tional in origin. Some are absolute, such as communications to attorneys. Others are
qualified: only unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited; 68 the journalist's
privilege may have to give way if compelling circumstances exist.69 Regardless of
origin or scope, however, the fundamental antagonism between the interests pro-
tected by privilege and the search for truth is recognized and the world, somehow,
does not come to an end. The difficulty, however, is that there is a factual distinction
between a privilege protecting confidential communications and one protecting past
acts. Where a privilege covers communications intended to be confidential, the
outside world is ordinarily unaware of the evidence. This may not at all be the case
with respect to prior sexual conduct. That is precisely why there has been, as will be
seen, such a plethora of constitutional litigation under Michigan-type statutes.
When a third party admits to his attorney that he committed a crime which a
defendant is charged with and provides sufficient itemization in the admission so that
there is corroborative detail in it,7° a defendant charged with that crime will not be
able to place such facts into evidence because he will be unaware of them. Despite
the sweep of Davis v. Alaska and Chambers v. Mississippi, where, through no fault
of the state's, or even of defense counsel, the defendant is unaware of critical
evidence of innocence, he is without both right and remedy. Such is the effect of
privilege. The dilemma posed by the juxtaposition of societal interests creating a
privilege and a defendant's constitutional right to introduce exculpatory evidence is
obviated by the inherently confidential nature of the privileged evidence.
67. See C. McCoPtttcK, supra note 12 § 72, at 170-72.
68. The fourth amendment is itself qualified, prohibiting only unreasonable searches and seizures.
69. State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971). For an example of a statutory journalist's shield law
see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A, 84A-21 (%Vest Supp. 1988).
70. Declarations against penal interest are admissible on behalf of an accused if there is corroborative evidence for
such declarations. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). It does not take much imagination to lace a confession to an attorney with
sufc.c;it detail about a crime to provide for self-corroboration.
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When evidence is covered by a rape shield statute, it is by definition not
confidential communication which is the subject of an exclusionary rule, but rather
conduct which may be a matter of public record such as prostitution arrests7 ' or some
other conduct the defendant is aware of either through his knowledge of the com-
plainant or through the knowledge of others he knows. In these settings, ignorance of
exculpatory evidence does not keep us from having to decide which way to strike the
balance between the societal interest in exclusion and the defendant's interest in
admission. If we mean what we say, however, in creating a privilege for prior sexual
conduct, then accessibility to proof of that conduct will not be an automatic ground
for its receipt into evidence.
II. PROBLEMS UNDER EXISTING RAPE SHIELD LAWS
A. Introduction
The Arkansas-type rape shield laws simply create procedural mechanisms to
insure that questions relating to the prior sexual conduct of the complaining witness
are resolved before trial and in secret. No substantive provisions are contained in such
laws. As has been seen, what little data there is on the application of such statutes has
not been discouraging. It is difficult, however, to conclude that the ultimate objective
of a rape shield statute-avoiding needless harassment and invasions of privacy of
complaining witnesses-is accomplished with such scant data.
The California-type statute involves considerable difficulty because it creates a
distinction between the evidence offered to prove consent and evidence offered to
impeach the credibility of the witness who denies consent. Often, this distinction is
more fanciful than real.72 Furthermore, such statutes are in effect in only a few states
and the case law under them does not suggest great success. 73
The federal statute, in effect in all federal courts and now in six states, appears
to have worked fairly well because of the presence of the catchall clause for evidence
constitutionally required to be admitted. While one might wonder whether the un-
certainty of admissibility introduced by the existence of an open-ended catchall clause
inhibits complaints by victims of sexual assault, this does not appear to be the case. 74
71. State v. Herndon, 145 Wis. 2d 91, 246 N.W.2d 347 (1988).
72. See Galvin, supra note 17, at 894-902.
73. Id. at 902.
74. Rape victim advocates in the states that have the catchall provision (Oregon, New York, Connecticut, Hawaii,
and Iowa) say that it has little or no impact on a victim's decision whether to report the assault to the police. Terry Lum
of the Sex Abuse Treatment Center in Honolulu stated that generally victims ask how much they will be "on trial,"
whether or not they are familiar with the law. She stated that since the introduction of this evidence is not automatic,
victims do not tend to regard it as determinative. Telephone interview with Terry Lum, Jan. 24, 1989. Similarly,
advocates in Connecticut, New York, and Iowa say that the catchall provision is not a factor in the decision to report rather
fear of retaliation and the expectation of insensitive treatment by law enforcement personnel discourage the victim.
Telephone interviews with Marion Taylor, Women's Center of Southeastern Connecticut, New London, Jan. 25, 1989;
Sally Angell, Rape Crisis Center of Greater Danbury, Jan. 26, 1989; Ilene Redden, Hartford Region Sexual Assault Crisis
Service, Jan. 27, 1989; Ann Sparks, St. Vincent's Hospital Rape Crisis Program, New York, N.Y., Jan. 24, 1989; Julie
Gumbiner, Iowa City Rape Victim Advocacy Program, Jan. 24, 1989; Linda McGuire, First Assistant Prosecutor,
Johnson County, Iowa, Jan. 24, 1989; Carol Meade, Iowa Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Des Moines, Feb. 2, 1989.
Two advocates report that although the law has a minimal effect on victims overall, they have seen a few victims pull out
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As has been noted, the definition of those instances when prior sexual contact be-
tween the defendant and the complaining witness may be admitted appears to have
been too narrowly drawn but the existence of the constitutional catchall provision
saves the rule. Nevertheless, the failure to make clear the waivability of the rule and
the lack of clarity regarding the standing of the complaining witness has served, in my
opinion at least, to constitute a weakness in the rule.
Examination of the Michigan-type statutes, in effect in one-half of the states,
however, reveals major problems in approach and effect.
B. The Impossible Goal of Michigan-Type Statutes
As has been seen, Michigan-type statutes define with precision those instances
in which the prior sexual conduct of the victim may be inquired into at trial. 75 The
obvious objective of such legislative draftsmanship is to prevent courts from admit-
ting anything other than what is explicitly authorized. The difficulty with this ap-
proach is that courts are under the constraints of Davis v. Alaska and Chambers v.
Mississippi and the effort of predicting all the possible instances when the constitu-
tional principles underlying those cases compel the admission of prior sexual conduct
must fail.
The dialogue between the Wisconsin legislature and its courts is illustrative of
this failure. Initially, Wisconsin's rape shield law excluded any evidence of prior
sexual conduct unless it was offered to show consensual relations between the com-
plaining witness and the defendant; to prove the source of semen, pregnancy or
disease, or to show prior false allegations of sexual assault. 76 In State v. Gavigan,77
the prosecution elicited the complaining witness's lack of prior sexual conduct to
show the unlikelihood of consent. The prosecution's theory was that because the
victim was a virgin she would be less likely to consent to having her first sexual
experience with a total stranger. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in upholding the
conviction despite the failure of the rape shield law to permit evidence for such
purpose, held that the statute had to be so construed because "[t]o exclude such
testimony would be to deny the jury access to critical facts surrounding the event. '78
In his dissent, Chief Justice Heffernan argued that the virginity evidence allowed the
jury to draw exactly the type of inference the rape shield law was meant to forbid: that
prior sexual conduct of the victim is relevant to the issue of consent. 79
The Wisconsin legislature thereafter amended its rape shield law to provide that
of prosecutions when they learned about the catchall and the possibility that evidence of their prior sexual conduct might
be admitted at trial. Telephone interviews with Marilyn Gunsul, Rape Victim's Advocate, Portland, Oregon, Jan. 24,
1989; Kate Davis, Rape Crisis Network, Eugene, Oregon, Jan. 27, 1989. Interestingly, one advocate reported that the
catchall was not an issue for rape victims because the police and prosecutors decline prosecution in those cases where they
think prior sexual conduct evidence would be constitutionally required to be admitted. Telephone interview with Marti
Anderson, Rape Crisis Center, Des Moines, Feb. 2, 1989.
75. Galvin, supra note 17, at 908-11.
76. Wts. STAT. § 972.11(2)(b)(3) (1982).
77. 111 Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).
78. Id. at 161, 330 N.W.2d at 577.
79. Id. at 172, 330 N.W.2d at 583.
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the exclusionary thrust of the law applied "regardless of the purpose of the admission
or reference unless the admission is expressly permitted under [the statute].' 80 State
v. Herndon8 l and State v. Pulizzano82 demonstrate the constitutional difficulties such
a restriction creates.
In Herndon, the victim claimed that she had been sexually assaulted by the
defendant after the defendant forced her into his automobile. Prior to trial, Herndon
offered to prove that the victim had twice been arrested for prostitution in the same
neighborhood and around the same time as his encounter with her. He also offered to
prove that the victim's mother disapproved of her daughter's activities and made clear
they were not to recur. The defendant wanted to show that the victim's motive to
fabricate the sexual assault was to explain her disheveled appearance to her mother
upon returning home without revealing that she was continuing in her activities as a
prostitute. The trial court, constrained by the narrowness of the rape shield statute,
sustained an objection to the proffer, noting that "if the defendant is convicted, the
appellate court will have to take another look at the literal application of the law. ' 8 3
Herndon was convicted.
On appeal, the court reviewed a variety of cases under the Michigan-type statute
and found that the possible impact of the excluded proof on the motive of the
complaining witness to falsify was too strong to warrant exclusion and that the
principles of Davis v. Alaska and Chambers v. Mississippi compelled the admission
of the evidence. Accordingly, it held the rape shield statute, as applied to the facts in
the case, unconstitutional. 84
In Pulizzano, the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting two of her
children and two nephews. One of the nephews testified about such an assault on him
and two other boys using terminology not ordinarily associated with a child of his
age. In an attempt to prove that he acquired a familiarity with such terms elsewhere,
Pulizzano inquired on cross-examination about a prior sexual assault and the trial
court, applying the rape shield law, precluded such inquiry. Pulizzano was convicted.
On appeal, the court of appeals found that the sexual assault was within the
wording of the rape shield law but that the application of the rape shield law to the
facts was unconstitutional under Davis v. Alaska. It noted that Pulizzano's effort to
rebut the inference that the child's sexual knowledge was gained as a result of her
assault on him was constitutionally sanctioned, and following a similar case in
Nevada, 85 reversed the judgment of conviction. Pulizzano is pending review in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.86
Herndon and Pulizzano are typical of many of the cases decided under the
Michigan-type statutes. In some cases the courts rewrite the rape shield law to
80. WVis. STAT. § 972.11(2)(c) (1985).
81. 145 Wis. 2d 91, 426 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1988).
82. 148 Wis.2d 190, 434 N.W.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1988).
83. Herndon, 145 Wis. 2d at 100 n.1, 426 N.W.2d at 350 n.1.
84. In finding the statute unconstitutional, the court directed the legislature's attention to the federal-type statute
with the constitutional catchall provision. Id. at 130, 426 N.W.2d at 363.
85. Summitt v. State, 101 Nev. 159, 697 P.2d 1374 (1985).
86. Pulizzano, 148 Wis. 2d at 190, 434 N.W.2d at 807.
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accommodate evidence whose admission is felt to be constitutionally mandated; in
others the courts find the law unconstitutional as applied to the facts.
1. Rewriting the Statute
Shockley v. State87 is one of several cases where prior sexual conduct, excluded
by a rape shield law, was tendered to explain physical evidence. In Shockley, the
defendant was not permitted to explain the victim's pregnancy by offering evidence
of other sexual conduct on her part. Tennessee's statute, like the federal statute and
that of several other states,8 8 did not permit proof of other sexual conduct to prove
pregnancy. The judgment of conviction was reversed, the court concluding that the
legislative intent was to remove common law smearing of the victim and the evidence
excluded was tendered for a different purpose.
In Commonwealth v. Lyons, 89 the defendant was not permitted to explain the
presence of blood in the victim's panties by offering evidence of other sexual conduct
on her part which he said had occurred the same day as the alleged rape. Pennsyl-
vania's statute90 did not permit proof of other sexual conduct to prove physical
consequences of intercourse. Nor did the statute allow the defendant to introduce
other sexual conduct to rebut the state's introduction of physical consequences evi-
dence. The appellate court reversed the conviction. The court, relying on Common-
wealth v. Marjorana,91 concluded that the rape shield law did not apply when the
defendant was seeking to explain the objective signs of intercourse, rather than
attempting to smear the credibility of the victim by offering other sexual conduct to
prove consent.92
Similarly, in State v. LeClair,93 the defendant wanted to show other sexual
conduct on the victim's part to explain the presence of semen. New Hampshire's
statute did not permit such proof. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of conviction, noting that the trial court had misinterpreted the statute and
that if it was to pass constitutional muster, it had to be interpreted more broadly to
permit the use of such evidence of other sexual conduct. 94
State v. Howard95 is like Pulizzano. The defendant offered evidence of a twelve-
year-old's prior sexual conduct to show that her "expertise" was not derived from his
rape of her. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that to avoid serious consti-
tutional issues, New Hampshire's rape shield law had to be interpreted to permit the
introduction of such evidence even though its literal wording excluded it. The judg-
ment of conviction was reversed.
87. 585 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
88. FED. R. EviD. 412; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982).
89. 364 Pa. Super. 620, 528 A.2d 975 (1987).
90. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3104a (Purdon 1983); see also ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (Supp. 1985).
91. 503 Pa. 602, 470 A.2d 80 (1983).
92. Lyons, 364 Pa. Super. at 624, 528 A.2d at 977.
93. 121 N.H. 743, 433 A.2d 1326 (1981).
94. See also People v. Mickula, 84 Mich. App. 108, 269 N.W.2d 195 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jorgenson, 512
Pa. 601, 517 A.2d 1287 (1986).
95. 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981).
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In Commonwealth v. Joyce,96 the defendant wanted to show that the victim had
been charged with prostitution twice in the six months preceding the date of the
alleged rape and that her motive to falsify the rape was her fear of a third prosecution.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that the trial court misapplied the rape
shield statute to exclude evidence indicative of a possible bias on the part of the
victim, concluding that the legislature did not intend to exclude such evidence in the
rape shield statutes. The judgment of conviction was reversed. Other courts have
dealt with motive evidence more directly, and like Herndon, have found rape shield
laws unconstitutional. 97
2. Problems in Constitutionality
a. Motive Cases
Rules of evidence relating to facts upon which a motive to falsify argument can
be based reflect the importance such lines of attack have in the impeachment process.
Unlike the rules of evidence relating to the proof of misconduct not amounting to
conviction, when the court has the discretion to preclude such proof altogether, and
if not precluded, the cross-examiner is bound by the witness's answer, 98 the cross-
examiner is never bound by the denial of facts upon which a motive to falsify can be
grounded. 99 One reason for this distinction is undoubtedly that the use of prior
misconduct is a general attack on the character of the witness while an effort to show
a motive to falsify is far more focused on the case in question and therefore far more
central to effective cross-examination.
Whatever the reason for the distinction, the United States Supreme Court in
Davis v. Alaska1°° raised to a constitutional level this particular method of impeach-
ment. In Davis, the Alaska courts precluded the defendant from examining a pros-
ecution witness about a juvenile conviction because of the state's confidentiality laws
relating to such convictions. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. It found
96. 382 Mass. 222, 415 N.E.2d 181 (1981).
97. The one occasion the United States Supreme Court has had to review "motive evidence" came in Olden v.
Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 480 (1988) (per curiam), where the lower court found Kentucky's rape shield law inapplicable but
nevertheless excluded evidence of other sexual conduct on grounds of prejudice. In Olden, the defendant, a black man,
was accused of various sexual assaults on a white woman. At the trial, he was not permitted to cross-examine her
boyfriend, who was also black, or to cross-examine her, about their existing extramarital relationship. The purpose behind
such inquiry was to show that the existing relationship provided the victim with the motive to lie about the sexual contact
with the defendant, who claimed such contact was consensual. The trial court excluded the evidence, not under Ken-
tucky's rape shield law, but rather on grounds that it was prejudicial to the victim. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme
Court reversed, finding that Olden's right to a fair trial compelled that he be able to impeach the motive of the complaining
witness with the excluded testimony.
More recently, in Daniels v. State, 767 P.2d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989), the defendant was charged with sexually
assaulting a foster child in his and his wife's care. He attempted to show that the child made the accusation of sexual
assault after it was discovered that she had admitted to sexually assaulting a young boy and he and his wife told her she
would have to leave because they had young boys in the house. The trial court excluded the evidence on the ground that
its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. The Alaska appellate court reversed on the authority of Davis v.
Alaska.
98. FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
99. G. LtLLY, supra note 16, at 358-59.
100. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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that such restraint was impermissible because the defendant was entitled to show that
the witness, who was on probation from a juvenile offense, had a reason to lie
because of his precarious status as a probationer. "[T]he exposure of a witness'
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally
protected right of cross-examination."' 0'1
Nowhere is the failure of the Michigan-type statutes more evident than in cases
where prior sexual conduct of the complainant is offered, not to show a pattern of
consent, but rather as the basis for the argument that such prior conduct is the factual
predicate for a motive to falsify. The Herndon case already discussed is but one of
many such cases. The Willis case previously mentioned, which demonstrated the
constitutional failure of an apparently innocuously worded consent exception to a
general rule of exclusion, is also one of the many cases in this category.
In State v. Jalo,0 2 the defendant claimed that the victim accused him of rape
because he had discovered her having sexual relations with the defendant's son and
that the accusation of rape was fabricated to retaliate and to avoid punishment for the
conduct the defendant claimed he observed. The trial court, applying existing Oregon
law, excluded the evidence; the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, 0 3 principally on
the authority of Davis v. Alaska. The Oregon statute was subsequently amended to
permit the use of prior evidence of sexual conduct if offered to show a motive to lie
or the bias of the complainant. l04
In Commonwealth v. Black,105 the defendant argued that his daughter's com-
plaint against him was designed to remove him from the house so she could continue
an ongoing sexual relationship with her brother. Applying existing Pennsylvania law,
the trial court excluded the evidence since it did not fit any of the exceptions of the
rape shield law. The Pennsylvania appeals court reversed on the authority of Davis
v. Alaska and the constitutional imperative not to exclude proof relating to motive to
lie.
These cases, as well as cases decided on nonconstitutional grounds, demon-
strate that a rape shield law not allowing for proof of prior sexual conduct on the
motivation of the complainant, where that motivation is an important issue in the
case, is too narrow and will always fail when subjected to the constitutional require-
ments of Davis v. Alaska. The Michigan-type statutes are burdened with a major
flaw.
b. Pattern Cases
One of the most difficult evidentiary issues arises when prior acts of misconduct
are offered, not to show a proclivity towards the commission of such acts since that
would be an improper purpose under Federal Evidence Rule 404, but rather to show
101. Id. at 316-17. See also Olden, 109 S. Ct. 480.
102. 27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976) (en banc).
103. Id. at 851, 557 P.2d at 1362.
104. Act of July 27, 1977, ch. 822 § 1(5)(a), 1977 Or. Laws 863, 864 (codified at OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §
40.210(2)(b)(A) (1984)).
105. 337 Pa. Super. 548, 487 A.2d 396 (1985).
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a pattern of behavior of which the behavior in issue is a part. In such a circumstance,
the evidence of other crimes may be received under the "plan" exception of Rule
404(b). For example, in a murder prosecution the prosecution may place into evi-
dence other murders committed as part of the spree which includes the homicide
charged. 10 6 The justification for such admission is predicated on the similarity be-
tween the other acts and the act in issue as well as the proximity in time between
them. 107
It follows then that when the defendant is charged with sexual assault, the
prosecution may place into evidence other sexual assaults by the defendant if they are
close in time to the one on trial and if there is a large degree of similarity between the
"other" acts and the one alleged.10 8 This is permitted because of the exceptions to
the general prohibition of such evidence found in Rule 404 relating to evidence
showing a "plan." Is there a parallel result with respect to other acts by the com-
plaining witness? Three of the states with Michigan-type statutes have such an
exception; 10 9 for the balance the issue is whether such an exception is constitutionally
required.
This difficult question is posed by a hypothetical created by Professor Berger.
She posits a case where a woman over a brief period meets men in a singles bar, takes
them home with her, and then has consensual sexual relations with them. After
having done this twenty times, she meets the defendant at the same bar, takes him
home with her, and then, according to her she is sexually assaulted; according to him,
their sexual relations were consensual. 110 Should the defendant be permitted to prove
the prior twenty consensual sexual acts between the complaining witness and other
men to bolster his defense of consent?
While the majority of commentators on the question say the pattern evidence
should be allowed,"' a minority believes the evidence is inadmissible,' 12 also the
view of the few but fractious cases deciding the question.' '3 The principal argument
against such proof is that what distinguishes the cases is that in the case on trial, the
106. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 783-85, 312 S.E.2d 40, 70-71 (1983); State v. Fernandez, 28 Wash. App.
944, 628 P.2d 818 (1980), modified, 640 P.2d 731 (Wash. App. 1981).
107. See United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1109-1110 (9th Cir. 1982), Williams, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d
40.
108. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 735 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (evidence that defendant committed sexual
assault on a 14-year-old babysitter was admissible under common scheme or plan exception to other crimes rule in his trial
for sexual assault upon his 14-year-old stepdaughter); People v. Oliphant, 399 Mich. 472, 250 N.W.2d 443 (1976)
(evidence that defendant sexually assaulted other women in his car after lulling them into it admissible to disprove his
version of alleged sexual assault in car).
109. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West Supp. 1989); MINN. R. EviD. 404(c)(1)(A)(i); Mt, s. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.347(3)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989); N.C. R. EvIo. 412(b)(3).
110. Berger, supra note 52, at 59-60.
111. See, e.g., Amsterdam & Babcock, Proposed Position on Issues Raised by the Administration of Laws Against
Rape: Memorandum for the ACLU of Northern California, in B. BABCOCK, A. FREE.SMAN, E. NORTON & S. ROSS, SEx
DISCRuMATION AND THE LAw 839, 841 (1975); Berger, supra note 52, at 65; Galvin, supra note 17, at 903-04; Note,
Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the Confrontation Clause?, 9 IND. L. REv. 418, 430 (1976).
112. See, e.g., S. BRowNtNt.uItE, supra note 1, at 385-86; 23 C. WRIGTrr & K. GRAHAt, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PRoCEDuRE § 5387, at 583-88 (1980).
113. See State v. Cassidy, 3 Conn. App. 374, 489 A.2d 386, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 803, 492 A.2d 1239 (1985);
State v. Vaughn, 448 So. 2d 1260 (La. 1984); State v. Patnaude, 140 Vt. 361, 438 A.2d 402 (1981); State v. Hudlow,
99 Wash. 2d 1, 659 P.2d 514 (1983) (en banc); State v. Morley, 46 Wash. App. 156, 730 P.2d 687 (1986).
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complaining witness claims lack of consent while in any other "similar" case there
is no such claim. Thus, such other evidence can be offered only for the impermissible
purpose of arguing that because consent was given on other occasions, it must be
inferred in the case on trial-exactly the type of argument rendered inadmissible by
a rape shield law.
The argument in favor of admissibility is that when there is a close nexus
between the "similar" acts and the one in issue, the inference that a plan to have
consensual sexual relations under those circumstances is a plausible one. Because the
inference relates to the plan rather than the general proclivity of the complaining
witness, the impermissible inference is not the one relied upon. Therefore the de-
fendant should be entitled to argue it.
There is no question that the similar acts evidence is offered as circumstantial
evidence of consent because, according to its proponents, it establishes a pattern of
conduct. The opponents see no circumstantial use other than the prohibited one.
While relevance is, as has been noted, a question of law under Rule 402, that does
not mean that the permissibility of an inference is a totally objective matter. Professor
Wigmore has stated that in determining relevance "the logical powers employed must
be those of everyday life, not those of the trained logician or scientist." '"1 4 While in
most cases, "everyday life" has a common meaning, it is certainly possible that in
some instances subjective considerations rooted in race, economic class, or gender
may influence a person's judgment grounded on "everyday life." Thus it may well
be that whose "everyday life" is called upon to draw the inference will determine
whether the evidence is admissible. " 5
It is unlikely that one more evidentiary analysis of this over-analyzed but dif-
ficult issue will make much difference. Nevertheless, it strikes me that when the other
acts are similar and close to the degree that Professor Berger's hypothetical envis-
ages, the evidence is relevant and admissible but its admission is not constitutionally
required. Once the evidence of similar acts is admitted, the prosecution is free to
argue to the jury that the absence of any complaint of assault in the other cases
establishes the bonafides of the complaint in the case before the jury and the jury is
certainly free to accept that argument. Admissibility, however, hinges not on what
the jury does with the facts but with the permissibility of the inference urged by the
proponent of the evidence. It is plausible for the defendant to argue that a woman who
has engaged in consensual sexual relations in circumstances close in setting and time
to those in issue has a plan to have consensual sexual relations under those circum-
stances. The plausibility of the argument establishes the relevance of the facts.
Simply because the evidence is admissible under a straight test of relevance,
however, does not establish that it is constitutionally required to be admitted. Absent
a rape shield law, the only traditional counterweight that would weigh against the
114. 1 Wi .Mo o- EVIDRZCE § 27, at 407 (3d ed. 1940).
115. See, e.g., S. BRowmL LtE.R, supra note 1, at 386; C. GiLLiGAN, IN A DIFFERFENT VoiCE (1982); S. Es'rICH, supra
note 1, at 57-66. Estrich observes that "force" means different things to men who, as boys, live with and accept a level
of force well beyond what most girls find common. Therefore, if male judges instruct juries on what is or is not
permissible force in a sexual assault case, a gender bias may easily be built into the law. Jurors may also reflect that bias.
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relevance of the evidence is the risk of confusion to the jury-that it might not
understand the distinction between evidence offered to show a plan, a legitimate
purpose, and evidence offered to show a character trait towards certain conduct, an
illegitimate purpose. Of course, when such evidence is offered against a defendant,
the same risk of confusion and also prejudice exist but this does not ordinarily serve
to exclude the evidence. In such cases, however, there is not the key distinction found
here; namely, in the incident underlying the trial, as opposed to the others, the
complaining witness denies consent.
It is this factual difference that urges against the constitutionality of the require-
ment that such evidence be admitted. The very fact that the prosecutor has a strong
argument to rebut the evidence makes its legitimate use a far less exculpatory item of
evidence than would be the case when the similarity between the crime charged and
prior acts is total. For the purpose of admissibility, it does not matter that the
opponent can muster an equal or even stronger circumstantial argument on the basis
of the facts; the only issue is whether the proponent's argument is one which can
rationally be made."16 The constitutional test for admissibility must be far stricter,
however. Certainly not all admissible evidence is constitutionally required to be
admitted. When, the weight of the evidence is as diluted as is the case here, because
of the signal distinction that in this case the complaining witness claims rape, the
admission of the evidence can hardly be said to be constitutionally required." 17
3. Reputation Evidence
Is evidence of the victim's reputation for promiscuity in general, or meaning
"yes" when she says "no" in particular, admissible? The answer should initially be
a function of the substantive law of sexual assault. If that substantive law makes the
defendant's state of mind on the victim's consent an element of the crime, then the
next issue becomes the defendant's awareness of such reputation. If there is aware-
ness then the Rule 403 counterweights must be considered.
The case law and jury instructions show a surprising amount of disagreement
among jurisdictions regarding the requisite mental state for a sexual assault convic-
tion. Some jurisdictions require no culpable state of mind, only that the act of sexual
contact or intercourse occurred without the victim's consent. 1 8 Others require that
the defendant's belief in consent be reasonable," 9 and still others allow a defense of
mistaken belief in consent without the requirement that the belief be reasonable. 20
116. See G. LILLy, supra note 16, at 30-33.
117. If the evidence is offered for purposes of showing a motive to falsify, then the result might well be different.
For example, if the defendant claims that the allegation of sexual assault is caused by his failure to pay for an act of
prostitution, then prior acts of prostitution under almost identical settings would be admissible to show the motive to
falsify on the part of the complaining witness.
118. See State v. Cantrell, 434 Kan. 426, 673 P.2d 1147 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984); State v. Reed,
479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984); People v. Hammack, 63 Mich. App. 87, 234 N.W.2d 415 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 294 Pa. Super. 93, 439 A.2d 765 (1982); WIsCOSNsm JURY INsTRUCTION 1200.
119. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRINtINAL INsTRUCTIoN No. 10.65.
120. Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). See also Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan,
2 W.L.R. 913 (1975). Professor Estrich takes the view that the law should impose a duty on men to respect the word
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Several states follow the view that the defendant's thoughts on the victim's
consent are not an element of the crime. 1 2 ' These states do not require the prosecution
in a rape case to prove a specific intent on the part of the defendant. The issue is
raised when the defendant asks and the trial court refuses to instruct the jury that "if
the defendant reasonably believed that the prosecutrix had consented to his sexual
advances that this would constitute a defense to the rape .... ",122 In these juris-
dictions the appellate courts, in affirming the refusal to give such a charge, state that
specific intent is not an element of rape, and therefore mistaken belief, even if it is
reasonable, is not a defense. 123 In these jurisdictions, therefore, evidence concerning
the victim's reputation for promiscuity or anything more specific would be irrelevant
and properly excluded.
Several states follow the view that a reasonable belief by the defendant that the
victim consented is a defense to the charge. In the related cases of Commonwealth v.
Sherry124 and Commonwealth v. Lefkowitz, t 25 the Massachusetts supreme court and
court of appeals affirmed judgments of conviction when the trial judge refused to give
a mistaken belief instruction. The courts acknowledged that the legislature, by omit-
ting a specific intent requirement from the sexual assault statute, could have sought
to deter rapists by putting them at risk for any sexual conduct induced by force or
threats despite a claim of consent.' 2 6 However, in Sherry, the defendants, while
raising the issue of mistaken belief, failed to raise the "reasonableness" of the belief.
Thus the court left open the possibility that a reasonable belief in consent could be a
defense to the charge of rape.' 27
California also adheres to the view that reasonable belief in consent is a defense
to a sexual assault charge.' 2 8 The California jury instruction for rape prosecutions
states that rape is a general intent crime and that intent is negated if the defendant had
a reasonable and good faith belief that the victim was consenting. 29 This instruction
must be given when the evidence at trial justifies such a defense.130
Alaska gives the defense the greatest latitude by following the English rule that
a good faith belief in consent, even if mistaken and unreasonable, is a defense.13'
However, while no specific mental state is mentioned in the Alaska rape law, the state
must prove that the defendant acted recklessly regarding the victim's consent. In
Reynolds v. State,' 32 the court held that a defendant can argue mistake of fact and the
state, to obtain a conviction, must prove that the defendant knowingly engaged in
"no." Thus, in her view, a victim's reputation is irrelevant since mistaken belief in consent is not a defense. S. Esmc,
supra note 1, at 98.
121. See supra note 118.
122. Commonwealth v. Williams, 294 Pa. Super. at 99-100, 439 A.2d at 769.
123. See cases cited supra note 118.
124. 386 Mass. 682, 437 N.E.2d 224 (1982).
125. 20 Mass. App. Ct. 513, 481 N.E.2d 227 (1985),further relief denied, 396 Mass. 1103 (1985).
126. Id., at 519 n.15, 481 N.E.2d at 231 n.15.
127. See Sherry, 386 Mass. at 697, 437 N.E.2d at 233.
128. People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975).
129. See supra note 119.
130. People v. Hampton, 118 Cal. App. 3d 324, 173 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1981).
131. Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
132. Id.
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sexual intercourse and recklessly disregarded his victim's lack of consent.133 Under
Alaska law, a defendant does not have to prove reasonableness; if the jury finds that
he was actually unaware of the risk that the victim was not consenting, he may be
acquitted. The Alaska rule gives the defendant the ability to prevail even if he acted
unreasonably. 134
When the defendant's state of mind concerning the victim's consent is in issue,
evidence of a victim's reputation for promiscuity or anything more concrete would be
relevant if the defendant was aware of such reputation and its use was to support his
defense of reasonable (or unreasonable), good faith belief in consent. Such use of
reputation evidence would not appear to be within the scope of a victim's privileged
prior sexual conduct since it does not matter what she did, only what she is reputed
to have done.' 35 In fact, since reputation evidence is offered solely because of its
impact on the defendant's state of mind, it could be totally untrue and still be
admissible.
Relevance alone, however, is not dispositive of admissibility. Even if relevant,
the counterweights of Rule 403136 and its state equivalents could prevent the defen-
dant from introducing reputation evidence. It is certainly possible that the reputation
evidence could be from so attentuated a source and so vague in its content that its
probative value would be exceedingly low. Juxtaposed with such minimal probative
value is the danger that the jury could use the reputation evidence improperly to infer
consent from the reputation for promiscuity instead of using the evidence for the
purpose for which it is offered, to prove the defendant's state of mind. Evidence
risking irrational decisionmaking is prejudicial under Rule 403 and therefore poten-
tially excludable under the rule.
A final mechanism to prevent reputation evidence from having an overreaching
effect 137 lies in the ability of the court to keep an issue from going to the jury. Where
the defense of mistaken belief in consent is judicially created, if the evidence does not
support such a defense, a trial judge may refuse to give the mistaken belief jury
instruction. 138 The same power would permit the court to exclude such evidence if an
accompanying offer of proof does not portend sufficient credible evidence to take the
issue to the jury. 139
Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically provides that "reputation
or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim . . . is not
admissible." 140 That provision, like all its other provisions, however, is subject to the
133. Id. at 625.
134. Reynolds at 625 (citing 2 Alaska Senate Journal 142 (1978)).
135. Conceivably it could be argued that if the purpose behind a rape shield law is to remove all impediments to a
victim's cooperation with the criminal justice system, even pure reputation evidence should be shielded. After all, even
the thought that a trial will lead to publication of a victim's reputation might discourage testifying. The remoteness of
reputation evidence would suggest that minimal probative value together with the traditional counterweights are sufficient
to exclude such evidence where admission is unwarranted.
136. FED. R. EvID. 403.
137. See S. BROWsNittLR, supra note 1, at 371.
138. People v. Hampton, 118 Cal. App. 3d 324, 173 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1981).
139. Id.
140. FaD. R. EviD. 412.
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constitutional catchall found in the Rule. Doe v. United States 41 explored the extent
to which reputation evidence would have to be admitted under the catchall provision.
In Doe, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant,
apparently on an army base. He had testified that several men told him she was
promiscuous and that he had read a love letter she had written to another man. In
compliance with the procedural requirements of Rule 412, he moved to have seven
items of evidence introduced under the catchall clause of Rule 412. The first five
pertained to the general reputation of the complaining witness as sexually promiscu-
ous, the sixth pertained to a telephone conversation he had had with her, and the last
related to his "state of mind as a result of what he knew of her reputation ... and
what she said to him." 142 The trial court ruled that all seven items were admissible.
The complaining witness appealed. Initially, the Fourth Circuit dealt with the
defendant's challenge to the complainant's standing to appeal. It found that affording
her standing was implicit in a statutory scheme that was explicit in its desire to protect
her privacy and that no other party in the case shared that interest. Accordingly, it
reached the merits of the case.143
As to the first five items, the court found that even before the enactment of Rule
412, federal law provided that evidence of a complainant's unchastity, whether in the
form of acts proving it or reputation evidence proving it, was ordinarily found
insufficiently probative on either the issue of consent or credibility to outweigh its
prejudicial effect. While the court expressed a reluctance to conclude that "extraor-
dinary circumstances will never justify admission of such evidence to preserve a
defendant's constitutional rights," 44 it did not find any such circumstances in the
record. As to the last two items, those not pertaining to the witness's general repu-
tation but pertaining specifically to the defendant's knowledge, the court held that
such evidence was admissible. The remaining five items ruled admissible by the trial
court were found inadmissible.
The result in the Doe decision is correct and has been so viewed.145 Aside from
the fact that reputation evidence is not evidence of prior sexual conduct, as long as
the substantive law of sexual assault makes a belief in consent a defense, the defen-
dant ought to be allowed to show the basis for that belief. It would make no sense to
permit belief in consent to be a defense and then preclude a defendant from adducing
evidence the essence of which is to create such a belief. Of course the admission of
the evidence does not automatically establish reasonable belief, it simply provides the
basis for an argument to that effect to the jury which is free to find otherwise. 146
141. 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981).
142. Id. at 47.
143. See also State v. Miskell, 122 N.H. 842, 451 A.2d 383 (1982) (where the victim had standing to appeal).
144. Doe, 666 F.2d at 48.
145. See generally Galvin, supra note 17, at 850-53.
146. It is tempting to draw an analogy to the law relating to assault where a reasonable belief in the victim's
aggressiveness is a defense to reasonable self-defense measures. See Bennett v. Scroggy, 793 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1986).
The analogy, however, breaks down quickly. Mistake, or incorrectly ignoring evidence of physical aggressiveness, risks
physical injury to oneself. Mistake, or incorrectly ignoring evidence of sexual interest, does not entail risks of the same
order or magnitude. Further, in the context of sexual relations, there is time to ask and the consequences of mistake,
whether reasonable or unreasonable, can be devastating for the nonconsenting party.
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4. Rebuttal Proof
We have already discussed cases where the inference of sexual knowledge on the
part of the complaining witness itself points towards the defendant. In such a case,
the defendant is permitted to introduce evidence of prior sexual conduct of the
complainant to rebut that otherwise normal inference. Evidence of the complainant's
virginity or homosexuality, if offered to show nonconsent (in the latter case to a claim
of consent to heterosexual relations) can be rebutted by prior sexual conduct incon-
sistent with the claim supposedly supporting nonconsent. Any rape shield law which
precludes such rebuttal proof would not pass constitutional muster. 147
C. Conclusion
As this review of cases and principles of rape shield litigation has shown, it is
impossible for any statute to proscribe the kinds of cases in which prior sexual
conduct of the victim should be excluded and still be constitutional. There is no
precedent for such a legislative determination of relevance and the absence of such a
precedent is understandable since legislatures generally recognize their inability to
cover all evidentiary possibilities. 148
The difficulty with this doomed effort at total legislative proscription is more
than just theoretical. Trial courts generally defer to the legislature and are more
reluctant to either reinterpret legislation or find it unconstitutional than appellate
courts. 149 Thus, where a statute is of the Michigan-type and the proffered evidence
is not within the specific exceptions contained in the statute, lower courts are reluc-
tant to admit the evidence. Appellate courts not quite as constrained and deferential
to legislatures are more likely to find that constitutional principles require admission.
The end result is reversals, which, if they are at the intermediate appellate level, may
themselves be only a step along the appellate process.
The nature of the reversal now becomes important. Where a judgment of con-
viction is reversed because the trial court improperly excluded exculpatory evidence,
the ordinary remedy is a new trial. This is not a case where the appellate ruling
suggests a legal insufficiency of the charge or the evidence requiring dismissal. We
are then back in a trial posture, only now a year or more after the original trial and
possibly an additional year or more from the incident giving rise to the criminal
prosecution in the first place.
In such a setting a prosecutor has three choices: drop the case, agree to a guilty
or no contest plea to a lesser offense, or continue with a case now weaker if for no
other reason than the passage of time. The first two of this trio of choices are
147. See State v. Williams, 16 Ohio App. 3d 484, 477 N.E.2d 221, aff'd, 21 Ohio St. 3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560
(1986); State v. Gavigan, Ill Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).
148. As has already been noted, exceptions to the rule prohibiting prior similar acts are permitted with the "'such
as" clause found in FED. R. EvID. 404(b). A similar legislative deference to the unpredictable complexities of what can
materialize in the courtroom can be found in the catchall paragraph to the various hearsay rule exceptions. See FED. R.
Ev1D. 803(24) and 804(b)(5), which empower the courts to admit hearsay having comparable guarantees of trustworthiness
to the hearsay admitted under the designated exceptions.
149. See, e.g., State v. Herndon, 145 Wis. 2d 91, 100 n.l, 426 N.W.2d 347, 350 n.1 (Ct. App. 1988).
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obviously not in the victim's interest. If the last of these alternatives is followed,
unless the victim is unavailable within the meaning of Rule 804(a), the victim must
testify at the retrial. Even if unavailable, if the error in the first trial was the improper
curtailment of the examination of the victim, then use of the transcript of the first trial
simply perpetuates the error and is therefore not a viable option. It would therefore
seem that the reversal would require that on retrial, if that is the option followed, the
victim must testify again. It is clear therefore that none of the three options created
by reversal is particularly in the interest of either the prosecution or the victim.
Nevertheless, this is precisely the result we must continue to expect, perhaps with
even greater frequency, as the number of cases finding rape shield laws unconstitu-
tional increases. There must be an alternative.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Professor Galvin, in her exhaustive and thoughtful article on rape shield laws,
concludes that rape shield laws are essentially rules of relevance and there is no
conflict between the victim and the defendant since the defendant has no right to the
admission of irrelevant evidence.150 Consistent with that approach, she urges that a
rule of evidence parallel to Rule 404 be adopted which would provide that the sexual
conduct of the victim of a rape is not admissible to support the inference that a person
who has previously engaged in consensual sexual conduct is more likely for that
reason to consent. This general ban on the impermissible use of prior sexual conduct
evidence is then excepted with a provision that such evidence may be admitted for
other purposes, and by way of illustration but not definition of such other purposes,
she lists proof designed to (1) prove that another person is responsible for the physical
consequences of the rape alleged, (2) prove bias on the part of the victim, (3) show
a pattern of evidence ("so distinctive and so closely resembling the accused's version
. . ."), (4) show reputation evidence known to the accused and offered to prove a
reasonable belief in consent, (5) rebut proof produced by the prosecution regarding
the victim's sexual conduct, and (6) show false allegations of sexual assault.15' She
would also add to Rule 608 of the Rules of Evidence a specific provision that
evidence that the victim has engaged in consensual sexual conduct is not admissible
on the credibility of the victim. 152
Professor Galvin recognizes that rape shield laws have a "hybrid quality." She
notes that "these laws are similar to the evidentiary privileges in that they seek to
protect the privacy interest of nonparty witnesses. Unlike privileges, however," she
concludes, "rape-shield-laws are designed to further truthfinding by excluding irrel-
evant and prejudicial evidence." 153
As has been seen earlier in this article, however, rules of relevance are already
in place and the two impermissible common law notions that a woman who has
150. Galvin, supra note 17, at 902.
151. Id. at 903-04.
152. Id. at 904.
153. Id. at 856-57.
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consented once is fair game and that promiscuity promotes dishonesty have been
discredited by cases. 154 Further, an honest application of the counterweights of Rule
403 does not place the policies of a rape shield law into the balance to offset minimal
probative value. If viewed strictly as a relevance issue, there is no basis to take the
victim's privacy into account. Courts have certainly not regularly taken the provision
in Rule 611 (a) giving them the power to protect witnesses from undue embarrassment
as a basis to protect the privacy of sexual assault victims. Even under Professor
Galvin's elaborate proposal, a court would have to stretch to consider policies gen-
erally recognized to underlie shield statutes under Rule 403. The protection afforded
by rules excluding irrelevant evidence is not enough; an openly recognized privilege
with respect to prior sexual conduct is called for.
It has earlier been pointed out that if rape shield laws are viewed as creating a
privilege, the knotty problem of waiver is easily handled. 155 In addition, the victim's
standing to challenge the admissibility of evidence relating to prior sexual conduct
and to appeal adverse rulings is fortified. That the privilege covers both otherwise
admissible and inadmissible evidence means nothing since that is the case with other
privileges as well. 156
It should also be abundantly clear that there are extraordinarily valid social
interests compelling the creation of a privilege. A victim's right to privacy with
respect to the most intimate aspect of human behavior is certainly an interest war-
ranting protection. 157 This is especially true where the right to privacy has been found
to have constitutional components in both the fourth amendment 158 and more gen-
eralized constitutional protections. 159 Coupled with this individual right is the highly
desirable societal interest that victims of crime shed any reluctance to report the crime
to the police predicated on a fear that appearance on the witness stand will be open
season on all past sexual conduct.
On the basis of these considerations, it is proposed that a privilege be enacted as
follows: Evidence of prior sexual conduct by a complaining witness in a sexual
assault prosecution is privileged and admissible only if the defendant's constitutional
rights require its admission. The complaining witness may participate in evidentiary
questions arising under this rule and may appeal an interlocutory order overruling the
claim of privilege.
Notice provisions comparable to those found in Rule 412 could then be ap-
154. See United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); State ex rel. Pope
v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976); State v. Geer, 13 Wash. App. 71, 533 P.2d 389 (1975).
155. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
156. For example, an attorney, in the course of speaking to a client, can learn both otherwise admissible and
inadmissible facts. The privilege applies to both. The same concept would apply to communications between spouses,
privileged under the laws of most states. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4502 (McKinney 1963).
157. The two policy considerations, individual privacy and a limited trial inquiry to encourage reporting, are
different. Theoretically, a sexual act committed in public could hardly be claimed to be private in nature. Nevertheless,
reporting sex crimes would be furthered by a rule prohibiting inquiry into such public behavior at a subsequent trial.
Therefore, even in such a case, the privilege would still apply although its basis would obviously not be the private nature
of the particular act.
158. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
159. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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pended to the rule requiring a pretrial in camera hearing of any litigant intending to
offer evidence of prior sexual conduct.t6°
So stated, the privilege would be comparable to the shield privilege journalists
enjoy in most states. 161 Its qualified nature is no different than Rule 412 as presently
worded. It does not appear that the qualified nature of the federal rule has served as
a major impediment to the reporting of sexual assaults.162 Furthermore, defining a
right or privilege in terms of constitutional considerations is not a novel concept. In
addition to such an underpinning to Rule 412, the prosecution's right to appeal in a
federal criminal case is defined in terms of the defendant's right to avoid double
jeopardy. t63 Indeed, the federal interlocutory appellate rights of the prosecution,
bounded as they are by the defendant's double jeopardy rights, serve as something of
a statutory model for a privilege also bounded by a defendant's constitutional rights.
While it is tempting to place into the privilege a legislative exception for prior
sexual conduct with the defendant, there does not appear to be any need to do so. Just
as a rape shield law which enumerates instances where evidence of prior sexual
conduct is admissible undertakes the impossible job of stating that in all others it is
not, a law which provides for automatic use of evidence overlooks that there may be
instances where such evidence ought not be admitted.t64 A note to the recommended
statute indicating the presumptive admissibility of such evidence might be in order.
160. The notice provisions in the federal rape shield statute are as follows:
(c)(l) If the person accused of committing an offense under Chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code [rape
or assault with intent to commit rape] intends to offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific instances of the
alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall make a written motion to offer such evidence not later
than fifteen days before the date on which the trial in which such evidence is to be offered is scheduled to begin,
except that the court may allow the motion to be made at a later date, including during trial, if the court
determines that the evidence is newly discovered and could not have been obtained earlier through the exercise
of due diligence or that the issue to which such evidence relates has newly arisen in the case. Any motion made
under this paragraph shall be served on all other parties and on the alleged victim.
(2) The motion described in paragraph (I) shall be accompanied by a written offer of proof. If the court
determines that the offer of proof contains evidence described in subdivision (b), the court shall order a hearing
in chambers to determine if such evidence is admissible. At such hearing the parties may call witnesses,
including the alleged victim, and offer relevant evidence. Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Rule 104, if the
relevancy of the evidence which the accused seeks to offer in the trial depends upon the fulfillment of a condition
of fact, the court, at the hearing in chambers or at a subsequent hearing in chambers scheduled for such purpose,
shall accept evidence on the issue whether such condition of fact is fulfilled and shall determine such issue.
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in paragraph (2) that the evidence which the
accused seeks to offer is relevant and that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible in the trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies
evidence which may be offered and areas with respect to which the alleged victim may be examined or
cross-examined.
FE. R. Evm. 412(c). This should be changed so that the procedural mechanism is triggered if either the prosecution or
the defendant intends to offer evidence of prior sexual conduct.
161. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 8-901-909 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1988); MD. Crs. & JU. PROC.
CooE ANN. § 9-112 (Supp. 1989).
162. See supra note 74.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1989).
164. The fortuity in a "stranger" rape case where the issue is one of identity, that the victim and defendant had,
on some prior occasion, had consensual sexual relations, should not serve to warrant the admission of that prior sexual
conduct. Unlikely as such a scenario is, a review of the cases reveals that stranger things happen.
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V. CONCLUSION
As this examination of rape shield law has shown, well-intentioned efforts by
legislatures to define the instances where evidence of prior sexual conduct is admis-
sible have, in a too-large number of cases, served to prolong litigation, a delay in no
one's interest other than the person charged with sexual assault. While the strong
aversion to the holdings of the older cases readily explains the desire to frame rape
shield legislation in terms of relevance, such a definition of the evidentiary concept
involved is both redundant of existing rules of evidence and too cramped in proce-
dural consequences to accomplish the underlying objective of a rape shield law.
Rather, a broadly stated privilege accomplishes the same objectives, avoids some of
the problems inevitable under most statutes in use at present, and creates options
which solidify the right of victims of sexual assaults. The continued viability of Davis
v. Alaska and Chambers v. Mississippi insures that the defendant's rights are not
overlooked.
The process of balancing is a delicate one. Over a decade of statutory drafting
and redrafting interspersed with case law has given us the reason to fine-tune that
balance. It is hoped that this Article contributes to that process.
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